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EXPENDED ON MERCURY-REDSTONE BOOSTER AND SATURN S-I STAGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center's (M_FC) presentation will
be given in four steps. The four presentations will cover separate but
related areas of effort expended by the MSFC.
I will give a rundown on the early research and development of two
parachute recovery systems - one being for the MERCURY-REDSTONE booster,
the other being the SATURN S-I stage. I will also give a short rundown
on two other related programs done parallel with the recovery system
developments - these being the MERCURY-REDSTONE booster retrieval exercises
and the salt water immersion of the H-I engine.
Mr. Lewis McNair will summarize the Rogallo Flexible Wing feasibility
studies for the first stage recovery on the C-I and C-2 SATURN programs.
Mr. Dietrich Fellenz will give a short review of study results, both
In-house and out-of-house, on recovery of an upper stage from orbit
employing a Rogallo Flexible Wing.
Mr. Luke Spears will cover the parametric studies that the MSFC has
underway now and planned. He will outline performance penalties,
operational considerations, and economic trade-offs. Mr. Spears will also
summarize the future effort on Booster Recovery by the MSFC.
II. RECOVERY PROGRAM
The Recovery Project Office, Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering
Division, MSFC, has been conducting studies on first stage recovery
since February, IncnL=j_.=_,,._°_-__.___oo_k_1#ey........qt,,d_s were conducted as early
as June II, 1958, by the Future Projects Office, MSFC.
Two contracts for the design _nd development of a recovery system
for the BATURN C-I booster and the MERCURY-REDSTONE booster, respectively,
have been supervised by the Recovery Project Office. The two recovery
systems employed the same basic technique since the requirements outlined
for both of the contractors stated that the system be highly reliable and
simple, avoiding in so far as possible, the use of techniques and/or com-
ponents which would require extensive development. Also, a major require-
ment imposed on the contractors was that the system be designed such that
it would no___ttinterfere with, or compromise the vehicle design. With the
above requirements and limitations, the only recovery system conceivable
was o_e employing parachutes.
Following the basic requirements that the booster recovery system be
highly reliable, simple, and avoiding in so far as possible the use of
techniques and/or components requiring extensive development work, a brief
outline of the MSFC's approach in determining the initial design of the
recovery system for SATURN C-I S-I stage is as follows:
I. Approaches that were considered.
Various approaches to the recovery problem were considered
in view of the foregoing requirements and limitations. The approaches
were generated by variations of the following parameters:
a. Booster cutoff conditions: velocity, altitude, and angle.
b. Booster re-entry: structural loads and temperature
capabilities.
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re-entry and impact.
d. Terminal recovery parachute:
e. Terminal deceleratln_ rocket:
and number.
2.
type, size, and number.
thrust, burning time,
Having given careful consideration to the above mentioned
parameters, it was decided that the simplest and quickest approach for
initial deceleration would be by ribbon parachute. Dive brakes were
undesirable for reasons of required size and complexity. The use of
retro-rockets for initial deceleration, in addition to being inefficient
weight wise, would require close attitude control of booster in order to
align thrust vector with the velocity vector. Use of parachutes for
initial deceleration required only quasi-stability of the booster per-
mitting angles of yaw up to ninety degrees at parachute deployment.
3. After the initial deceleration by the ribbon parachute,
further deceleration of the booster to water entry velocity could be
accomplished by the following: (I) parachutes, (2) retro-rockets, or
(3) combination of parachutes and retro-rockets.
Making the proper selection required consideration of reliability,
simplicity, weight, volume, and cost of each alternative. The use of
only retro-rockets would mean that the stabilization of the booster with the
initial parachute would be ineffective at lower velocities, and _he thrust
and velocity vector would not be aligned so as to provide predictable
deceleration. The use of only parachutes to accomplish recovery appeared
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very attractive at first glance; but because of booster weight s,ach as
the SATURN, the water impact velocity would be too high. Also, the
complexity of a parachute system would increase and the reliability
would decrease as the parachutes increased in si_e and number. The !
conclusions were that neither the retro-rocket system nor the parachute
system was capable of performing the terminal deceleratlon phase by
themselves.
With the above observation, it was decided that the most efficient
deceleration system would be to combine the use of a few parachutes for
the high velocities, and other means, such as retro-rockets for the lower
velocities.
The immediate advantages of the combination system over the system using
the retro-rockets only were (i) booster attitude stabilized by parachutes
during retro-rocket firing, and (2) reduced weight and cost. The com-
bination system advantages over the system using only parachutes were
(I) greatly reduced complexity, (2) increased reliability, (3) reduced
weight, and (4) reduced parachute stowage volume requirement.
The booster attitude at water impac_ was considered for both the
end-on and horizontal positions. The horizontal position presented the
following problems: (I) placement of retro-rockets, (2) the possibility
of impacting on top of a wave with the center section, and (3) the possible
misfiring of retro-rockets, thus, providing an unpredictable attitude at
water impact. It was therefore decided that the end-on position would
have a definite advantage, and the booster was far more capable of standing
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heavy loads in the end-on position than the horizontal. As a result,
the method and sequencing of the system selected was (I) initial
deceleration by ribbon parachute, (2)_ermlnal deceleratlon by parachutes
and retro-rockets, and (3) end-on atti£ude at water impact.
The control system (sequencing System) was not flnallzed at the ter-
mination of the studies, but the method of initiating the operation of
the system would most probably have been to use either a barometric
switch, deceleratlon switch, or the control timer on the booster, or any
combination of the three to have giwn greater reliabillty.
After having made some preliminary Investigations and selectlng the
recovery system design approach as outlined above, a contractor proposal
was accepted and funded by MSFC in February, 1959.
The recovery system consisted of a deceleration system and a control
system that provided for recovery of the booster from the ocean. The
deceleration system consisted of parachutes which deployed after re-entry,
and a retro-rocket system which decelerated the booster to a safe velocity
for Water impact. The control system consisted of the devices which
determined the initiation of the recovery events. Th_s system located
the parachutes and control unit in a cylindrical s_aped container at the
top of the stage and the retro-rockets on the periphery of the tall structure.
During the course of the recovery system development, preliminary
investigations indicated that the ability of the SATUP_ booster structure
to withstand re-entry and impact loads was marglnal_ but acceptable, since
no reuse of components was planned. A damaged booster was acceptable provided
the booster would float so as to allow retrieval.
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As the development p_ogram progressed, changes in the vehicle
configurations and in the cutoff conditions were made. This necessitated
further investigations into the ability of the booster structure to with-
stand re-entry and impact loads. After careful evaluation, it was con-
cluded that the booster could not reasonably be expected to survive re-entry
without the incorporation into the recovery system of special means to
stabilize the booster attitude prior to re-entry and during re-entry.
Studies made of the additional recovery system requirements and the
various design constraints, imposed as a result of the specific nature
of the SATURN vehicle, led to the adoption of a recovery system concept
incorporating the following features:
I. Spatial attitude control of the booster from separation to
the start of re-entry by means of vernier rockets, which were to be
lo_ated near the forward end of the booster. This system incorporated its
ow_ndependent stable reference system and the necessary associated
/
hat_ware.
2. During the free space portion of the f_ight, an inflatable
drag device initially housed within the recovery package was to be
i_flated and deployed so that it would help stabilize the booster and
augment its aerodynamic drag during the re-entry period with a resultant
reduction in the peak aerodynamic loads on critical areas.
3. The terminal portion of the recovery was to be accomplished
by the original system which deployed a 57-foot-diameter first stage
parachute; the first stage parachute in turn would deploy a cluster of
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terminal velocity of i00 ft/sec. A series of landing rockets were to
be ignited to reduce the booster water entry velocity to theoretically
zero.
To accommodate the modification, two design layouts were proposed.
Figure I shows the proposed layopt of components which would have required
modifications to the existing front I-beam structure. Figure 2 shows the
layout which required minimum modifications to existing Structure by pro-
vidlng a wafer or spacer for installation of the attitude control system
and sub-systems. This allowed more time to test and:_uallfy the complete
recovery system by requiring a later delivery dace for installation.
Figures 3 through 9 give typical cutoff conditions investigated and
illustrate the sequence of events of the revised recovery system.
With the proposed incorporation of the above mentioned features,
additional funds were requested by the contractor. The overall SATURN
program at the time was having funding problems; and since recovery was
not a primary mission, the booster recovery program was postponed to later
vehicles in order to make funds available for other necessary flight
hardware required on early flights.
The MERCURY-REDSTONE Recovery Program was an outgrowth of a feasibility
study initiated by the Future Projects Office of this Center. In June, 1958,
a feasibility study contract on booster recovery was initiated by the
Future Projects Design Branch (presently Advanced Flight Systems Branch),
Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering Division, with Aeronautical Equipment
Research Corporation, a Division of M. Stelnthal and Company, Inc.
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During the time this study was being conducted, the MERCURY Program came
into existence. The Future Projects Branch having supervision over the
study contract, requested, received, evaluated, and accepted the contractor's
proposal on a recovery system applicable to the MERCURY-REDSTONE booster.
After acceptance of the proposal, the technical supervision was transferred
to the Recovery Project Office. The basic scope of work covered design
and development, bench testing of components, aerial testing of parachutes
and overall system, finalization of design and drawings, and finally fabri-
cation and delivery of five systems.
The recovery package (Figure i0) is a self-contained unit. It is
installed in the booster by joining two mating structural rings, one an
integral part of the booster, the other a part of the recovery system
structure. Installation of the package is accomplished by bolt attachments
through the mating rings, and attachment of the power supply and telemetry
network plugs. All components of the recovery system are installed in the
package prior to installation on the booster.
Parachute recovery is accomplished in the order shown in Figures II
through 14. The first-stage parachute is deployed in a reefed condition
to limit the possible bending moment on the booster within its structural
capability. When sufficient time to orient the booster in a vertical ta£1-
down attitude has passed, the parachute is disreffed to allow greater decel-
eration. When the first stage parachute has brought the booster below a
5000-foot altitude, and has been deployed for more than 15 seconds, the
rate of descent will be in the range of 300 to 350 feet per second, and
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within the design capabillty of the final recovery parachutes. At that
time the first-stage parachute will be disconnected, and acting as a pilot
parachute will then extract and deploy the final recovery parachutes. The
final recovery parachutes will deploy reefed to limit the load on the
booster, and progressively open through a second step of reefing to their
full size. When the final parachutes are fully deployed, terminal velocity
at sea level is approximately 40 feet per second.
During the time the contract was in effect, the recovery system
conceptual design was established, and fabrication of three systems
initiated (one of which is approximately 95% complete). The other two
are approximately 40% completed. The drop test'program, although
difficulties were encountered in the first drops, was progressing
satisfactorily at termination of contract. Several times during the
development, changes to the recovery system had to be made to guarantee
no interference or compromises to the primary mission of the booster.
The final design, both mechanically and electrically, was approved by
the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) and the MSFC.
The end of the program came when contractor and funding problems
were encountered. The MSFC was unable to obtain additional funds to complete
the development program and delivery of flight hardware.
A major problem in the water recovery program for the MERCURY-REDSTONE
booster is the determination of possible damage sustained upon water impact,
the angle of flotation, and the depth of submersion. The solution to the
problem was of great interest as the solution of these unknown factors
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determined the method for safing and retrieval employed in floating the
booster into the recovery yes,el. The tests were conducted at Madkfm
Mountain quarry, aedstone Arsenal, with a booster approximately four
years old, i.e., the REDSTONE RS-33, which was used by the Army as a
back-up in the REDSTONE program and also as a troop training missile
at the Ordnance Guided Missile School. RS-33 was altered in weight and
configuration so as to simulate MERCURY-REDSTONE booster retrieval
conditions.
In parallel to the impact and flotation tests, the proper procedures
were established for safing the booster prior to floating aboard the
recovery vessel. During the performance of this exercise, handling pro-
cedures were also studied and later applied during the rehearsals in the
Atlantic Ocean.
Results obtained fromprior investigations indicated that the use
of an LBD as a recovery vessel was the most practical method of recovering
a MERCURY-REDSTONE booster. A two-day training exercise was conducted,
about 50 miles out at sea from Norfolk, Virginia, to ascertain the
capabilities of the LBD and to provide training for the underwater demo-
lition team and LSD crew.
Speo_al recovery equipment was used by the UDT in preparing the
booster for towing aboard ship and for receiving and securing the booster
to the saddles.
Prior to bringing the booster aboard the LSD, the saddles in which
it was to be set were positioned and anchored in the ship's well. The
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saddles were used and were placed 36 feet 4 inches apart along the ship's
centerline. The rear skid was placed 19.5 feet from the stern gate
allowing about i0" feet of WUL_ZLL_---'.... area _u_._... ... e_=.........e=_l nf the booster
and the stern gate. Since six connecting points were established on the
booster for handling purposes, six 175-foot-long lines were made up, with
quick fastening snaps, and numbered for ident_ficatlon.
There were four retrieval exercises conducted. Figures 15 through _;
19 illustrate the position of the saddles in the well of the I_D and
operational procedure in towing the booster into the well of the 18D and
placed on the saddles.
The primary objective of this first retrieval attempt was to check
out the proposed handling procedures. As the first step, the booster,
swimmers and their rubber boat, and the towing crew aboard the _VF were
launched. The _D drained the well and moved away several thousand yards.
The swimmers then approached the booster and went through the saflng
procedures without any difficulty, and also installed the handling connections,
After the safing operation was completed the booster was taken in tow
by the LCVP and positioned astern the LSD which was maintaining a constant
heading into the sea. The LSD was ballasted so as to have 8 feet of water
in the well at the stern gate sill. The LCVP continued towing until its
bow was over the _SD stern gate, then reversed, disconnected its tow line,
and moved off to the port side and stood by. Swlnm_ers with lines from the
LSD attached lines to prescribed connections on the booster, and the booster
was positioned over saddles. Once the booster was positioned, deballastlng
of the well proceeded until booster rested firmly on saddles. After the
Ii
we]] was drained, the booster and reeov_rv _q,,_pm..c w.r_ rh=rU=a _n_ _=_=a=
The second operation omitted the safing procedure, but went through
_I th _n_Jn_ hoost@r ont an_ h_ _ Tq_ _,4_h _h_ TQ_ m_4n_4.4._ a
heading of 2 to 3 knots into the waves. The third operation was very
similar to the second. A change on the tiedown location of the nylon
restraining slings was made.
The final operation was a complete simulated recovery. The booster
was set free and all personnel stayed aboard the ISD. The LSD deballasted
and steamed off ten miles from booster. At ten miles the booster was held
on surface radar while the P2V tracked it 50 miles from 1500 feet.
Once the tracking exercises were over, the LSD started toward the
booster. Ballasting of LSD and preloading of LCVP were performed while
enroute. When the LSD was approximately i000 yards from booster, the I_VP
was launched and proceeded to the booster. Upon arriving at the booster,
the swimmers went through the safing operation; the booster was taken in
tOW, and brought into the well of LSD and positioned as before.
Sea water immersion tests were conducted on a Rocketdyne H-I engine
in order to evaluate the corrosive effects of sea-water recovery on the
engine and to define the procedures necessary to restore the engine for
flight service. This program involved a series of tests in which the
H-I engine was immersed in sea water for given periods of time, followed
by various post treatments designed to minimize the corrosive effect of
sea water. The engine was then disassembled, evaluated for corrosion
damage, reassembled, and test fired.
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f. Hot fired short R,,r=e_n, =,A ;,,11 A,..-a+4^._ Ilr-._ .^. •
2. Second test - June 1961
a. Immersed H-I engine to a depth of I0 feet for one hour,
half submerged for three hours, and on the surface for three hours.
Waited twelve hours before purging, and applying minimumb,
preservatives.
c. Upon arrival at the MBFC, it was dismantled, inspected,
cleaned, replaced damaged parts and assembled.
d. Hot fired short duration and full duration.
3. Third test immersion in August 1961 - Hot fired in March 1962
a. Dropped H-I engine into water to simulate water entry
conditions, immersed it, held it half submerged, and on the surface for a
total of nine hours.
b. Washed it with fresh water, no preservative compounds
were used.
c. Upon arrival at the MSFC, it was dismantled, inspected,
and partially cleaned, and left in storage.
d. Six months later the engine was assembled and hot fired,
short duration and full duration.
The two reasons for delay on the third test ate as follows:
i. The Test Division was over loaded with work.
2. The first two tests were so successful that the Recovery
i
Project Office had difficulty Justifying the manhours required to complete
the hot firings, especially since the engine was dismantled, and the com-
ponents looked as good as the previous two times.
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In order to establish an approximate cost factor, a log was kept of
the procedures, reconditioning manhours, materials, and an itemized list
of replaced engine parts. The cost to _ehover and recondition the H-I
engine was approximately 5% of the cost Of a new one.
In closing, it should be stated that the selection of the recovery
systems employing parachutes was primarily brought about by the require-
ments and limitations previously stated, and possibly early availability.
Also, the MSFC saw no need in duplicating stud F efforts by other
government agencies that were investigating the economics and feasibility
of other recovery system concepts. Aware that the studies were giving
varyln_ results, the MSFC preferred to develop a simple recovery system
capable of recovering the SATURN S-I stage and actually recover the flrBt
flight vehicles. Having actual post-fllght hardware on hand would provide
factual data and define precisely the economics, feasibility, and practi-
cability of booster recovery. This would be accomplished without having
to develop a new recovery technique. However, during the parachute recovery
system development program on both the SATURN and MERCURY-REDSTONE vehicle
programs, funding problems were encountered; and in both cases, the first
program to be canceled was recovery.
Between the termination of the SATURN parachute recovery system and
parallel with the H-I salt water exercise, several proposals with different
recovery system concepts were received and reviewed by the MSFC. Among
these proposals were two similar techniques utilizing the Rogallo Flexible
Wing concept. Approximately six months after termination of SATURN recovery
.ii
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program, funds were again made available. At this time, the concept
that looked the most promising was the Rogallo Wing; and a decision was
made to investigate the feasibility of the Rogallo Wing to recover a
SATURN S-I stage of the C-i or C-2 program. Mr. McNalr will present
the result of the studies.
Rodolfo M. Barraza
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